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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
By JAMES C. QUARLES*
Although important principles of statutory construction were reiterated
by the Georgia courts during the survey period, the chief interest in these
cases derives from the application of these principles rather than from any

novel development of doctrine.
The very important question of the effect of codification was discussed in
two decisions, Norris v. HcDaniel' and Sirota v. Kay Homes. Prior to
codification, an Atlanta ordinance provided that property for which re-

zoning was sought should be placarded with a sign at least "1 2 square feet."
The notice involved in the Sirota case measured three feet by four feet. In
the City Code of Atlanta adoped the year following the enactment of

that ordinance, the sign was required to measure at least "12 feet square."
The contention that the difference in wording was caused by a clerical or
typographical error was rejected by the Supreme Court. It relied upon the
wording of the adopting ordinance, and said that a change by official codification resulted from the adopting statute rather than any legislative

power of the codifiers. The Code provision, being inconsistent with the
earlier ordinance provision, therefore prevailed, and the notice provision
had. not been complied with. The Norris case presented the situation of a
1927 statute transferring McDuffie County from the Augusta Judicial

Circuit to the Toombs Judicial Circuit, while the 1933 Code named McDuffie County as being in the Augusta Circuit. Thus there was a direct conflict between the 1927 statute and the 1933 Code as adopted by the General Assembly. The Supreme Court in this case, too, pointed out that a
codification is given effect because of the adopting statute rather than the
codifiers' power, but here came to the conclusion that the 1927 statute
prevailed. The court felt the historical note to the section in the 1933
Code showed that the codifiers and legislature had "simply overlooked"
the 1927 statute, and held that McDuffie County was in Toombs Circuit.
The court was probably guided to its decision in part by the fact that
everyone had for so long considered McDuffie County as in the Toombs
Circuit. On the other hand, although it is impossible to.say definitely without greater knowledge of the facts, the legislative body of Atlanta would
not likely in approximately one year increase the size required of a notice
on city property from 12 square feet to 144 square feet. The two cases
present the difficult choice between modifying the plain statement of a later
statute so as to approach the more probable legislative intent, and making
certain the language of a codification at the risk of warping the legislative
intent. There is certainly much to be said for the reasoning of Chief Justice Duckworth's dissent (concurred in by Mr. Justice Hawkins) in the
Norris case, where he stated that the "undesirable consequences of a re*Associate Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University;
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versal are infinitely less important than the upholding and preservation of
provisions of our official Code which was enacted into law by the legislature."
A repeal by implication, though such repeals always meet with courts'
disfavor, was found in Collier v. Mitchell.' The court pointed out that
such repeals result necessarily when the later statute is repugnant to the
earlier one or when the later statute covers the whole subject matter of
the earlier enactment. In this case, the court concluded that the later
statute in dealing with the qualifications of judges, of a municipal court
intended to deal with the whole subject matter of his qualifications, and
therefore requirements set up by the earlier act were not in force. In
Goebel v Hodges,4 the Court of Appeals found the two statutes there in
question were not inconsistent, since the trend of legislative enactments on
the subject matter showed a constant expanding of jurisdiction of the court
to which the acts related. The later act, it was found, was not intended to
cover the whole subject. '
In both Cole v. Foster' and Lancaster v. State7 the contention that
the statutes involved were void for vagueness was rejected. In the former
case, the requirement of the act that peace officers' benefits and annuities
should not be paid until necessary funds had been obtained was found to
be merely "a matter of administering the act in accordance with its terms,"
and in the latter, the Court of Appeals said that "willful or wanton," used
in defining the offense of reckless driving, had an established meaning in
civil and criminal statutes and decisions.
The Supreme Court in Schneider v. City of Folkston' declared unconstitutional a local statute which sought to amend the charters of two
municipalities on the ground that the act referred to more than one subject and, since one of the municipalities was not mentioned in the title,
the act contained matter different from what was expressed in the title.
Thus the act violated both part of the constitutional provision9 which
requires unity of subject matter and expression of it in the title of each
law.
The special constitutional requirements for the passage of local laws
0 which
was before the Supreme Court in Robertson v. Temple,"
held that
the requirement for publicaiton" required publication in the proper pape!'
for the county of the legal situs of the municipality, and there only, so
publication in another county, even though the county was partly within
the municipality, was not compliance with the constitutional provision.
The courts in other cases also stated rules for statutory construction,
although the rules played a less important part than in the cases mentioned
above. Some of these statements were that statutes should be construed
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so as to harmonize with each other," that statutes will not be interpreted
to have retroactive application unless the legislative language clearly requires it, a1 and that penal and condemnation statutes are to be strictly
construed," as are statutes of limitation." The courts also relied to some
extent upon the construction of similar statutes 6 and the background and
history of the legislation."7.
One legislative act in this general field that may have important and
beneficial effects is the statute 8 setting up within the State Department of
Law a Bill Drafting Unit, whose primary function will be to "aid and
advise the members of the General Assembly in the drafting of proposed
legislation." The drafting of statutes is as complex and difficult as it is
important, and it is no reflection upon the members of the legislature to
say that many are not prepared to accomplish it without expert assistance.
This statute will provide for assistance in this matter and leave individual
legislators more time and freedom to devote to what should be their
primary and most important function, the formulation of legislative policy.
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Wimberly v. Wimberly, 82 Ga. App. 539, 61 S.E.2d 508 (1950).
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